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The Child Status Protection Act:
Does Immigration Math Solve
the Family Unity Equation?
Shane Dizon*
I. INTRODUCTION
Using a seemingly straightforward mathematical formula, the Child
Status Protection Act ("CSPA") changes how children can attain
permanent residence in the United States immigration system. Historically,
a child "aged out," and thus lost the ability to retain status as a child2 as
soon as she reached twenty-one, regardless of whether the immigration
petition was timely filed. Using a cryptic statutory calculation, the CSPA
fixes the child's age when the petition for the child (with the child as direct
beneficiary of the petition) or her parent (with the child as a "derivative"
beneficiary, tagging along to a petition filed for her parent as the direct
beneficiary) is filed, guaranteeing that the child would not suddenly age out
due to processing delays within the Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration
Services ("BCIS") 3 and/or the Department of State ("DOS").
4
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1. Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1) (2004) (defining a "child" for United States immigration
purposes as "an unmarried person under twenty-one years of age"). The CSPA altered this
general definition to make the date of filing, not just the child's actual age, a crucial date in
determining whether a son or daughter would be considered a "child" for filing purposes.
See CSPA §§ 2-6 (amending 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1153, 1154, 1157, 1158).
3. The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services now performs the functions
of the old Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), including the adjudication of
immigrant petitions and for granting permanent residence to those present in the United
States based on those petitions via a process known as adjustment of status. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1103(a) (2004). While the Department of Homeland Security has now renamed BCIS as
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services, this note retains the use of BCIS for
consistency and clarity. All references to INS are those made in titles of cited authorities.
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This note analyzes the difficulties the CSPA poses in its applications to
eligible petitions - as illustrated by the amount of clarifying guidance
issued by BCIS and DOS, the expansive amount of literature generated by
immigration practitioners and interested organizations, and most recently,
the input of courts in interpreting the CSPA. This note also discusses how
the CSPA may represent a trend away from the institutional solutions used
to combat the "age out" problem and towards a stronger preference for
statutory fixes. Lastly, this note questions the CSPA's effectiveness in
promoting family unity in U.S. immigration law, particularly against the
backdrop of other recent legislation purporting to address that goal.
I. SUMMARY OF THE CSPA'S EFFECT5
Broadly speaking, the CSPA fixes the age of an alien child as "the date
on which the petition is filed with the Attorney General" for classification
based on the following qualifying petitions: 6 as an immediate relative of a
United States citizen,7 as the child of a lawful permanent resident,8 as the
child of an applicant for employment-based permanent residence, 9 as a
diversity immigrant,' ° or as a child accompanying or following to join an
asylum or refugee parent. 1 The effect of the CSPA is to "credit" the time
lost while the petition is being adjudicated by the appropriate government
agencies back to the alien child.
In practice, the CSPA is a subtraction formula. It reduces a child's
actual age at the time her application for permanent residence is approved
- either within the U.S. through adjustment of status or abroad through an
immigrant visa issued by a U.S. consulate - by the amount of time the
petition was pending. 12 In the case of petitions on behalf of the spouses
4. The Department of State is responsible for granting permanent residence to aliens
outside of the United States who are the beneficiaries of approved immigrant petitions via
its consulates in a process known as an immigrant visa application, or more popularly,
consular processing. See 8 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2004).
5. An exploration of each difficult situation - and the resulting minutiae of
calculations - that may hypothetically arise under the CSPA is beyond the scope of this
note. For a sampling of such scenarios, see Howard W. Gordon & Tina Niedzwiecki, The
Child Status Protection Act: Is the Problem of "Aging Out" Solved?, IMMIGR. L. TODAY,
May-June 2003, at 14.
6. A qualifying petition may be one filed for the parent which gives the child
"derivative" status, or one filed directly for the child.
7. CSPA, supra note 1, at § 2. Such individuals are eligible for permanent residence
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A) (2004).
8. Id. at §§ 3, 6. Such individuals are eligible for permanent residence pursuant to
8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a)(2)(A), 1153(d) (2004).
9. Id. at § 3. Such individuals are eligible for permanent residence pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
10. Id. Such individuals are eligible for permanent residence pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1153(d).
11. Id. at §§ 4-5. Such individuals are eligible for permanent residence pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (2004) and 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(1)(2) (2004), respectively.
12. CSPA, supra note I.
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and/or children of United States citizens, this "CSPA age" is simply the
date of filing, since there is no additional waiting time involved due to visa
backlogs for such immigrants. 13
Yet, in the cases of children of permanent residents, the calculation is
slightly different due to visa backlogs that result from the limitation on the
number of immigrants admitted under this category. 14 In such instances,
the CSPA starts with the child's age on the day the visa number becomes
available - mandating that the application for permanent residence be
made within one year of this date - then subtracts the amount of time the
petition was pending to figure the "CSPA age.'
' 5
Finally, in those cases where a lawful permanent resident parent
acquires citizenship while the child's qualifying petition is pending - the
"CSPA age" is the child's age as of the date of the parent's naturalization.16
To use the subtraction analogy, the child's "CSPA age" is her actual age at
the time she acquires permanent residence minus the days the petition was
pending since the child became eligible to apply for permanent residence
based on the qualifying petition. A similar provision governs cases where a
married child of a U.S. citizen divorces while the qualifying petition is
pending -the "CSPA age" is the child's age of the date of the divorce. 17
III. THE GUIDANCE PROBLEM: ONE ACT, FOUR VOICES
Though much anticipated during its trip through Congress and widely
lauded upon its approval, the CSPA has been a source of noticeable
confusion for the immigration law community in the two years since its
passage. Government agencies, practitioners, and interested organizations
alike have taken diverse stances on the CSPA - addressing practical issues
13. CSPA, supra note 1, at § 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2).
14. CSPA, supra note 1, at § 3. Due to the backlogs in the family-based second
preference category for spouses and children of lawful permanent residents, these
individuals cannot apply immediately for permanent residence upon approval of the
immigrant petition. They must wait until their priority dates - the date on which the
immigrant petition was filed - become current. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(a)(1), 1153(a),
1153(g). The current visa backlog as of February 2004 is nearly four and a half years,
except for Mexican nationals, for which the backlog is approximately seven years. See
Department of State, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, Visa Services, Visa Bulletin, No. 66, Vol. 8, available at
http://travel.state.gov/visa-bulletin.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004).
15. CSPA, supra note 1, at § 3.
16. A child under twenty-one of a lawful permanent resident benefits if the parent
becomes a United States citizen through naturalization by changing classification from a
visa-backlogged second preference to a non-backlogged immediate relative. See CSPA,
supra note 1, at §§ 2, 6.
17. For children under twenty-one to attain permanent residence as an immediate
relative of a United States citizen or child of a permanent resident, they must be unmarried.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(c)(1). So an under-twenty-one-year-old married child of a U.S. citizen,
who divorces, changes classification from a visa-backlogged third preference to a non-
backlogged immediate relative. See CSPA, supra note 1, at § 2.
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of applicability and scope as well as substantive legal interpretation.
Courts have also chimed in on the CSPA - with the majority of decisions,
save one, giving the CSPA at least cursory mention.
A. BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES MEMORANDA
Roughly a month after passage of the CSPA on August 6, 2002, the
BCIS issued its first "preliminary" field guidance memorandum to its
officers on the new law.18  The three-page memorandum spoke largely
about basic difficult scenarios caused by. changes in marriage and
citizenship status. 19 It also emphasized the centrality of the one-year filing
requirement for children of lawful permanent residents and the immediate
effectiveness of the CSPA. 20  Lastly, the memorandum stressed the
applicability of the CSPA to approved immigrant petitions where no "final
action" had been taken by the appropriate government agency on a
subsequent application for permanent residence. 21 Due to its brevity, the
first memorandum met with much criticism from the immigration
community at large.22
Five months after issuing the first memorandum, BCIS issued a second
memorandum containing "additional" guidance about the CSPA Over
twice the length of its predecessor, the new memorandum clarified many
key questions about inapplicability, retroactivity, and finality.24  In
particular, the memorandum extensively addressed the CSPA's application
in cases where a priority date visa backlog prevented immediate use of an
approved immigrant petition to apply for permanent residence.25 In
addition, the memorandum noted that the CSPA all but eliminated the need
to process "age out" cases - those immigrant petitions and applications for
permanent residence where a primary or derivative beneficiary was in
danger of turning twenty-one - via special expedited processing units at
the BCIS's Service Centers.26  The memorandum also explained the
18. INS Memorandum, The Child Status Protection Act (Sept. 20, 2002), available
at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/CSPA092002_pub.pdf. Earlier, shorter
guidance had been issued specifically to INS asylum personnel, since only § 4 of the CSPA
applied to asylum cases. See INS Memorandum, "H.R. 1209 - Child Status Protection Act"
(Aug. 7, 2002), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/hrl209.pdf.
19. INS Memorandum, The Child Status Protection Act, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. This portion of the memorandum reflects the fact that the immigrant petition
approval and the subsequent application for permanent residence based on that approved
petition are separate steps in some cases. Essentially, the child gets "credit" for the time her
permanent residence is pending during each of the two steps.
22. Criticism of this memorandum and subsequent ones appears at Part B, infra.
23. INS Memorandum, The Child Status Protection Act - Memorandum Number 2
(Feb. 14, 2003), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/CSPA2_pub.pdf.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. INS Service Centers have guidelines and procedures for requesting expedited
handling of petitions and applications; historically, "age out" cases have fallen under this
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adaptation of the CSPA formula to diversity visa applicants. First, it
determined pendency as the time period between the first day the child's
parent could apply for the lottery and the date indicating selection (in
essence, "approval") of the lottery application. Then, it subtracted the
resulting period from the child's age on the date a visa became available to
her parent, thus enabling an application for permanent residence.27
Arguably, the most controversial effect of the second memorandum
was that it narrowed the interpretation of the CSPA for practitioners and
aliens hoping to benefit from an expansive reading of the statute.
28
Specifically, the memorandum's dismissal of the CSPA's potential
applicability to other immigrant categories and its inapplicability to
reopened and/or reconsidered cases have provoked concern in the
immigration law community at large.29
On its face, the CSPA never intended to reach nonimmigrant visa
cases, as it addressed only immigrant classifications.3 °  Still, the
memorandum confirmed a narrow inference that there was no overall
"intent" to apply the principles of the CSPA to all other immigrant
classifications. 3' The implications of this statement - isolating the
principles and impact of the CSPA from those of other major pieces of
immigration legislation - suggest its shortcomings in contributing to
family unity.32
The memorandum's discussion of Motions to Reopen and/or
Reconsider likewise starts with the obvious: that denial traditionally ends
the pendency of an application for permanent residence.33 A Motion to
Reopen and/or Reconsider filed after the CSPA's August 6, 2002, deadline
would not fall under the CSPA, especially for fear of encouraging less
timely motions filed solely in an attempt to benefit from the CSPA.34 What
is troubling is the case in which denial occurs after all administrative
appeal remedies had been exhausted,35 where the Motion to Reopen and/or
category. See e.g., Expeditious Handling Requests, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, California Service Center,
at http://uscis.gov/graphics/fieldoffices/california/aboutus.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
27. The result of a successful diversity visa application - one selected by the
diversity visa lottery - essentially gives the applicant the functional equivalent of an
approved immigrant petition which the applicant can subsequently use to apply for
permanent residence, subject to a waiting period not unlike the priority date visa backlog,
although much shorter. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(c), (g).
28. See INS Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2, 4.
29. Again, criticism from the larger immigration law community of this
memorandum and subsequent ones appears at Part B, infra.
30. INS Memorandum, supra note 23, at 2.
31. See id. at 2, fn. 2.
32. This topic is explored in detail at Section V, infra.
33. See INS Memorandum, supra note 23, at 4.
34. See id.
35. Arguably, this would trigger the "final action" referred to by BCIS in the first
memorandum. See INS Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3.
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Reconsider was filed before August 6, 2002, and is still pending after
August 6, 2002. The memorandum states that such a case would also not
16
enjoy protection.
Such a reading seems to encourage the very thing the CSPA hoped to
avoid - processing delays. Here, the delays are in the adjudication of the
Motion, so as to cause loss of eligibility to individuals as children under
applications for permanent residence that were timely filed before they
reached age twenty-one. An extension of this logic would also be
potentially devastating if applied to asylum applications, which take long
periods of time to process due to the fact that such cases can be appealed,
in some instances, all the way up to the United States Supreme Court.3 7
That is, once the case leaves the administrative system to be reviewed at
the Court of Appeals level, a "final" decision by the immigration
authorities is arguably being appealed, and such "finality" cuts off the use
of the CSPA.
B. DEPARTMENT OF STATE CABLES
The Department of State issued its own field guidance to United States
consulates abroad on implementation of the CSPA.38 The first DOS cable
was more on point than its BCIS counterpart, immediately delineating
where the CSPA would have the largest, novel, or no impact.39 The August
2002 DOS cable, released two weeks before the first BCIS memorandum
focused on the anticipated problem areas that were not addressed until the
second BCIS memorandum, released in February 2003.40 The DOS also
gave detailed notation instructions for CSPA cases as a "workaround" for
the old, non-CSPA-ready consular computer records.4 '
One particularly striking interpretation made by the first DOS cable
was that aliens qualifying as K-4 children (those with a U.S. citizen parent
petitioning for them directly or as a derivative through a petition for their
36. See id.
37. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), the highest administrative
reviewing body of immigration law, has jurisdiction to review an immigration judge's
denial of asylum (either after its referral by an asylum officer or directly in removal
proceedings). See 8 C.F.R. § 3. l(b)(3) (2002). The United States Circuit Courts of
Appeal have jurisdiction to review BIA decisions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (2002); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.18(c) (2002).
38. See DOS Cable, Child Status Protection Act of 2002: ALDAC #1 (Aug. 26,
2002), at http://travel.state.gov/state 163054.html.
39. See generally id.
40. See generally id. These problem areas were methodically explored category-by-
category by the first DOS memo, and included discussion of the marriage and naturalization
problems in determining "CSPA age," applying the CSPA formula to diversity visa
applicants, and the CSPA's effect or non-effect on K or V visa categories (both turn on the
presence of a pending family-based immigrant petition), to list a few. Curiously, the DOS
interpretation of how CSPA would be used on diversity visa cases was precisely the one
used by BCIS in its second memorandum six months later.
41. Id. 21-26.
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noncitizen parent) could get CSPA protection if they had filed their own
immediate relative immigrant petition and were accompanying a K-3
parent (an immigrant with a U.S. citizen spouse petitioning for her) with
her own immediate relative immigrant petition.42 This view directly
contradicted that expressed in the second INS memorandum that the CSPA
did not reach the K visa category at all.43
The second DOS cable on the CSPA was more exhaustive than the
first, correcting several preliminary assumptions made, and delving deeper
into difficulties specific to processing of permanent residence applications
at consulates abroad." It again offered specific instructions on using the
consular communication system and resources to determine CSPA
applicability, which the INS memoranda did not.45
Although the second cable reversed initial DOS guidance about
CSPA's applicability to the K visa category, 46 its language raised an
interesting dilemma about the interaction between that category and
immigrant petitions. The K category, as well as the V category,47 depends
upon the pendency of an immigrant petition.48 Would the fact that the
CSPA keeps the underlying immigrant petition valid fail to protect the K or
V status, since that status is conferred because a valid immigrant petition is
pending?49 These seemingly inconsistent points of view are of general
42. Aliens are allowed to enter the United States on K-3 and K-4 nonimmigrant visas
while their immigrant petitions are pending; this entry allows them to reunify with their
United States citizen parent or spouse and to file for permanent residence through
adjustment of status instead of waiting abroad to do so via consular processing. See Legal
Immigration Family Equity ("LIFE") Act, Pub. L. 106-553, 114 Stat. 2762; "K"
Nonimmigrant Classification for Spouses of U.S. Citizens and Their Children Under the
Legal Immigration Family Equity Act of 2000, 66 Fed. Reg. 42,587 (Aug. 14, 2001), 67
Fed. Reg. 74,727 (Dec. 9, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. §§ 212, 214, 245, 248, 274a).
The DOS cable seems to extend CSPA protection only to those children who were direct
beneficiaries, not derivative beneficiaries under their non-citizen parent. For more on K visa
holders, see Part V, infra.
43. See INS Memorandmn, supra note 23, at 2, n.2. The DOS later reversed this
position in its second cable. See DOS Cable, Child Status Protection Act of 2002: ALDAC
#2 31 (Jan. 17, 2003), at http://travel.state.gov/state0l5049.html.
44. See DOS Cable, supra note 43. The second DOS memo dealt squarely with the
difficulties of meeting the one-year requirement in § 3 of the CSPA if the applicant was
applying via a consulate, since this process requires transmission of paperwork between INS
and DOS in addition to correspondence between the applicant and DOS. See id 15-25.
45. See id. 27, 33.
46. See supra note 43.
47. The requirements for V visa holders are similar in nature to those of K visa
holders, only the qualifying immediate relative relationship is to a lawful permanent
resident, not a United States citizen. See LIFE Act, supra note 42. In fact, to qualify for a
V visa, applicants must not only have an immigrant petition on their behalf pending, it must
have been pending for a long time - at least three years. Id.
48. See supra note 42.
49. The aim of the LIFE Act in expanding the K and V nonimmigrant visa categories
was to reunite families kept apart by the fact that the immigrant petition was still pending,
and that there would be no way to bring the beneficiary over until the application for
permanent residence was approved. See, e.g., 146 Cong. Rec. S. 11850 (daily ed. Dec. 15,
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concern to those who consider family unity an important objective of the
U.S. immigration law system, as well as of immediate, specific concern to
practitioners left trying to make sense of the conundrum for themselves, let
alone for their clients.
C. PRACTITIONER INTERPRETATIONS
The immigration law community had greatly anticipated the passage of
the CSPA from its introduction in the House of Representatives in 2001 to
its ultimate signature into law by President George W. Bush in 2002.50
There was concern that the events of September 11, 2001, would cool
government attitudes towards pro-immigrant legislation.5  Yet, the
legislation rode smoothly through the legislative process on its way to
eventual signature by President Bush on August 6, 2002.52 Accordingly,
practitioners expressed their enthusiasm about what promised to be an
important statutory remedy to a pressing problem in immigration law.
53
However, that anticipation was tempered by the realization that the
"math" of the CSPA would hardly be an easy fix to the "age out"
problem. 54  Practitioners begrudgingly noted that the government would
2002) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
50. Coverage of the CSPA's progress through the U.S. Congress was particularly
extensive in practitioner update newsletters. See, e.g., Lawyers Introduce a Variety of New
Legislation, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 15, 664, 665 (Apr. 16, 2001); House Approves
Bill to Address "Aging-Out" Problem; Subcommittee Passes Affidavit of Support
Legislation, 78 INTERPRETER RELEASES, No. 23, 985 (June 11, 2001); Senate Judiciary
Committee Approves "Age-Out" Measure; New Bills Introduced, 79 INTERPRETER
RELEASES No. 21, 780-81 (May 20, 2002); President Sends Homeland Security Dept. Bill to
Congress, Signs Refugee Bill; Senate Clears Child Status Protection Act; Other Activity, 79
INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 25, 940, 942 (June 24, 2002); Congress Sends Bill Providing
"Age-Out" Protection to President; Other Activity, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 30, 1124
(July 29, 2002); President Signs "Age-Out " Bill; Other Activity, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES
No. 32, 1193 (Aug. 12, 2002).
51. See, e.g., Austin T. Fragomen & Howard W. Gordon, Recent Legislation and
Current Immigration Topics, 1275 PRACTICING L. INST., CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES 7, 25 (Oct. 18, 2001).
52. See generally H.R. REP. No. 107-45 (2001), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 640
(CSPA approved by voice vote in committee without amendment); 147 CONG. REC. D538-
39 (2001) (CSPA passed by the House of Representatives by suspension of the rules); 148
CONG. REc. D607 (2002) (CSPA passed by Senate with only technical corrections as
amendments).
53. See, e.g., Charles Foster, Legally Entering and Staying in the U.S.A., 66 TEX. B.J.
38, 39 (Jan. 2003) (calling the CSPA a "welcome piece of legislation"); Christopher Nugent
& Steven Schulman, A New Era in the Legal Treatment of Alien Children: The Homeland
Security and Child Status Protection Acts, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 7, 233, 239 (Feb.
19, 2003) (predicting the impact of the CSPA to be "far-reaching, as it fundamentally
reforms the process for determining whether a child has 'aged out' of eligibility for visa
issuance or adjustment of status in most immigration visa categories.").
54. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 53 (evaluating the CSPA's formula as "fairly
complex, but basically allow[ing] the age of the child to be fixed on the date on which the
visa petition for the parent is filed"); Austin T. Fragomen & Howard W. Gordon, Managing
Change: Recent Legislation and Current Immigration Topics, 1340 PRACTISING L. INST.,
CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 173, 190 (Oct.-Nov. 2002) (describing the
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take a long time to determine its guidance on the CSPA with regards to its
own personnel, let alone to the immigration law community.55
Practitioners characterized the final version of the CSPA as well-
meaning in theory, but difficult to apply in practice.56 To prove this point,
the majority of practitioner articles written within the first year of the
CSPA's enactment concentrated on developing and analyzing countless
hypotheticals where the CSPA would fail to protect a child from aging
out.57 Their criticism focuses squarely on Section 3 of the CSPA, which
tries to address the situation where, although the immigrant petition for the
parent has been approved, a visa number is not available due to backlogs.58
Another major concern cited by practitioners is the inability of the
CSPA to protect against delays in the other agencies potentially involved in
the approval of an immigrant petition. For example, when children seek
permanent residence based on a U.S. employer sponsoring their parent, the
CSPA does not guard against delays by the Department of Labor and state
workforce agencies in processing the labor certification needed to start
such a process.5 9 Given the delays at these agencies, a child seeking such
derivative status, who initially would not need to worry about aging out,
might be in trouble.60
However, practitioners' concerns about Department of Labor delays
putting a child in danger of aging out pale in comparison to potential delays
CSPA's formula as "relatively complex" and predicting that "agency interpretation may
ultimately differ from our initial understanding of the provisions.").
55. See, e.g., Pravinchandra J. Patel, The Child Status Protection Act (Public Law
107-208, 116 Stat. 927, August 6, 2002), IMMIG. DAILY (ILW.COM), 2 (Dec. 5, 2002),
available at http://www.ilw.com/lawyers/articles/2002,1205-patel.shtm (noting that "the
Department of State has candidly acknowledged that the language of some CSPA sections is
complex and that there may be refinements in interpretation in the future... [t]herefore, one
has to keep an eye on any guidance or instructions that the DOS and/or INS may
periodically issue.").
56. See, e.g., Tammy Fox-Isicoff & H. Ronald Klasko, The Child Status Protection
Act: Is Your Child Protected?, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES No. 28, 973 (July 21, 2003)
(remarking that "unfortunately, the [CSPA], though benevolent in intention, may not be as
benevolent in implementation.").
57. See, e.g., Patel, supra note 55, 12-28.
58. See supra note 14.
59. Carl Shusterman & Elif Keles, An Analysis of the Child Status Protection Act,
1340 PRACTICING L. INST., CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 35, 41 (Oct.-Nov.
2002). Prior to the filing of the immigrant preference petition, the sponsoring employer
must file an application for labor certification with the Department of Labor demonstrating
that there are no able, willing, qualified, and available United States workers to fill the
position on a permanent basis, and that the employment of the sponsored alien will not
adversely affect the wages and working conditions of similarly employed workers in the
United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(5) (2004).
60. Processing times for labor certifications are roughly one year at the Department
of Labor, but around two years at the respective state workforce agencies. See U.S. DEPT.
OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMIN., Foreign Labor Processing Times and
Dates, available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/foreign/times.asp (Feb. 2004).
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in the Department of State's handling of immigrant petitions.61
Specifically, because an approved immigrant preference petition for an
alien outside the United States needs to be sent from the BCIS system to
the DOS for final immigrant visa processing at a U.S. consulate, there may
be confusion as to whether the child met the one-year filing requirement.62
Since immigrant visa processing cannot begin until DOS receives the
approved petition from BCIS and then asks the alien to apply for the
immigrant visa abroad, the fact that no application is technically "pending"
between BCIS approval and the alien's immigrant visa application
potentially counts against the one-year filing requirement, even though the
delay is not due to any fault of the alien.63 Some practitioners have argued
that the one-year requirement be read more liberally. In particular, they
contend that notification from the consulate that the child can be
interviewed for the immigrant visa - the last step in the permanent
residence process - will start the one-year clock, rather than the time the
64priority date on the preference petition becomes current.
More broadly speaking, some point out that the CSPA does not save
those children who cannot file for permanent residence within one year of
visa availability. In these cases, although the immigrant preference petition
is approved before the child's twenty-first birthday or August 6, 2002,
whichever is later, visa backlogs prevent either the adjustment of status or
the immigrant visa application from being filed based on the preference
65petition so as to create the necessary "pending" application.
A related concern is the problem of visa regression, where although a
visa number is available at the time the child files for permanent residence,
61. Only employment-based immigrants need to go through labor certification, and
they make up less than seventeen percent of all legal immigrants to the United States. See
Ruth Ellen Wasem, U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. 9 (Library of Cong. Feb. 18, 2004). Yet all immigrants must deal with the
Department of State if they are seeking permanent residence from outside the United States.
See supra note 4.
62. Cyrus D. Mehta, New Interpretations of the Child Status Protection Act,
13-15 (Mar. 14, 2003),
available at http://www.cyrusmehta.com/news-cyrus.asp?newsid=817&intPage=l 1.
The process requires several communications regarding information submission and
appointment scheduling with the Department of State's National Visa Center and the United
States consulate abroad at which the alien will be filing for her immigrant visa.
63. A practitioner has yet to make the argument that although the U.S. government
automatically transmits the approved petition from BCIS to DOS to enable the alien to start
the immigrant visa application process, this period of transmittal should allow the
application to be considered as "pending" for CSPA purposes.
64. Fox-Isicoff & Klasko, supra note 56, at 977. The authors interpret the language
in § 3 of the CSPA of "when an immigrant visa becomes available" as being when the DOS
schedules the immigrant visa interview, not when the preference petition is approved and its
priority date is current. Id. They likewise interpret the CSPA's "seeking to obtain the
immigrant visa" language as being satisfied when the child applies in person for the
immigrant visa. Id.
65. Id at 975.
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it subsequently becomes unavailable, preventing completion of the
permanent residence application.66 The intricacies of visa retrogression
aside, practitioners have noted the lack of comprehensiveness in the BCIS
and DOS memoranda on this issue, conceding it is one they will have to
resolve without guidance.
67
Another concern is the instance in which the sponsoring parent is
receiving permanent residence through adjustment of status in the United
States, while her child is processing a following-to-join application
abroad.68 A following-to-join application poses an interesting dilemma for
family unity, since it often applies in cases where only one parent can come
to the United States first and must wait to bring the rest of the family over
much later for reasons that could be personal, financial, or employment
related. Similar to the aforementioned concerns, practitioners wanted to
make sure not only which actions of the child would trigger the one-year
filing requirement of the CSPA, but that the behavior of the BCIS
concerning the forms necessary to process a following-to-join application
would not further cause the child to lose time and thus be in danger of
"aging out.''69
Practitioners were also concerned about the ability of the CSPA to
protect an alien child if the denial of the preference petition was being
appealed or a motion was made to reopen and reconsider the case.7° Yet,
they were fairly confident that government interpretation would allow for a
child to exhaust her remedies in the BCIS and DOS hierarchies and still
retain the protection of the CSPA since a "final determination" had not
been made on the immigrant petition.71
Although practitioners generally noted that the CSPA was only
narrowly retroactive - it only applied to immigrant petitions filed before
enactment that were still "pending," rather than ones already approved - a
broad hope that the CSPA was retroactive was exactly what foreign
nationals harbored.72 While not a problem of practitioner interpretation, the
immigrant community's initial beliefs about the breadth of the CSPA's
66. This situation would happen, for example, if the visa preference category under
which the child or the parent through which the child is attaining derivative permanent
residence is oversubscribed, causing the DOS to go backwards, only making current
preference petitions with a priority date earlier than that of the applying alien.
67. See Gordon & Niedzwiecki, supra note 5, at 20 (commenting that "while the
[government's February 14, 2003] memorandum addresses two possible retrogression
scenarios, practitioners should be aware that other complex retrogression circumstances
might arise, which will require careful analysis of age-out questions[.]").
68. Fox-Isicoff& Klasko, supra note 56, at 977.
69. Id
70. Gordon & Niedzwiecki, supra note 5, at 18.
71. 1d. at20.
72. See, e.g., Online Chat with Carl Shusterman,
Child Status Protection Act: Explaining the New Law, available at
http://immigration.about.com/library/weekely/aa092002b.htm (Sept. 9, 2002).
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retroactivity has proved to be an obstacle to providing accurate legal advice
on the CSPA to frustrated immigrants.73
Practitioners also criticize the CSPA because the specific backlog
problem it addresses is merely symptomatic of "the inability [of the BCIS]
to efficiently perform the functions allocated to it by Congress."
74
Practitioners characterize acts such as the CSPA as "piecemeal, 'fix the
symptom not the underlying problem"' measures 75 instead of as
comprehensive or fundamental changes. Legislators, in concert with the
practitioner community, repeatedly introduce bills which criticize the
fundamental flaws in the system responsible for processing U.S. immigrant
benefits.76 Some practitioners have even called on their peers to take their
criticisms of the CSPA's perceived inflexibility to the courts.77
D. COURT DECISIONS
Due to the recency of the CSPA's passage, only a few courts have had
the opportunity to apply it. These courts typically have done so without
extensive comment.78  In some cases, they reaffirm long-standing
principles of review in immigration law, such as preclusion of certain types
of relief (such as the CSPA) if a foreign national does not exhaust her
administrative remedies during the appeal process before the immigration
judge or Board of Immigration Appeals.79
73. Id.
74. Joseph Spanier, The Legal Immigration Family Equity Act and Immigration and
Naturalization Service Implementation, 4 J.L. L. & FAM. STUD. 363, 373 (2002).
75. Id. But cf Nugent & Schulman, supra note 53, at 238 (characterizing the CSPA
as "substantive, improving children's access to certain immigration benefits" and
"fundamentally reform[ing] the process for determining whether a child has 'aged out' of
eligibility"). The Nugent & Schulman article does concede that despite the laudable theme
of the CSPA, it does not cover "age out" problems for immigrant children who are detained
or in the juvenile court system.
76. See, e.g., 147 CONG. REc. S3275 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein); CONG. REc. H907 (daily ed. March 14, 2001) (statement of Sen. Pallone).
77. See, e.g., Cyrus D. Mehta,
Pushing the Envelope with the Child Status Protection Act, § 4 (Nov. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.cyrusmehta.com/news-cyrus.asp?newsid=915&intPage=6 (predicting that
"practitioners may ultimately have to resort to litigation in order to ensure that the CSPA
protects the broadest group of beneficiaries.").
78. See, e.g., Razik v. Perryman, No. 02 C 5189, 2003 WL 21878726 (N.D. I11. Aug.
7, 2003) at *2 (reaffirming briefly that because the CSPA allows for the adjustment of status
of children who would have aged out is one reason BCIS should adjudicate plaintiffs' long-
pending adjustment of status applications); Alvidrez v. Ridge, 311 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1165
(D. Kan. 2004) (clarifying that the CSPA does not apply to nonimmigrant visas such as the
V visa, so standing does not lie for a challenge of constitutional rights even if the plaintiff
actually filed for a V visa, which he did not do); Doe v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 389 n.5
(E.D. Va. 2004) (noting that there is no applicability of the CSPA to defendant, who herself
or whose family can not possibly file an immigrant petition); Catalan-Zacarias v. Ashcroft,
73 Fed. Appx. 284 (9th Cir. 2003) (rebutting the notion that CSPA can apply to a foreign
national if he does not exhaust his administrative remedies before an immigration judge or
the Board of Immigration Appeals).
79. See Catalan-Zacarias, supra note 78.
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However, one Ninth Circuit case, in affirming the CSPA's potential
applicability to a foreign national tied up in the appeals process on his
asylum case, discusses the CSPA extensively. 80 To directly resolve the
case, the court applied a general, common-law definition of "final
determination" to find the CSPA protection was still available to the
foreign national since it is the decision of an appellate court such as a
circuit court or the Supreme Court that "ultimately settles the dispute
between the parties," rather than the "final determination" of an
administrative court such as the Board of Immigration Appeals. 81 But the
court, in going through congressional intent, confirmed legislative desire
"to address the often harsh and arbitrary effects of the age-out provisions
under the previously existing statute" and "to override the arbitrariness of
statutory age-out provisions that resulted in young immigrants losing
opportunities, to which they were entitled, because of administrative
delays." 82 Finally, the court addressed a desire of the federal court system
not to have essentially the same effect of foreclosing an "age out" remedy,
such as the very well-documented administrative backlog the CSPA was
intended to prevent.
No statutory purpose or objective would be furthered by giving the
narrower or less usual of the two fixed meanings to the term "final
determination," and thus depriving immigrants of their eligibility for
adjustment of status simply because their cases were pending before a court
instead of an administrative agency.83 This broad statement by the court
seems to allay any fears of misinterpreting "final determination" by the
courts so as to disadvantage those foreign nationals seeking CSPA
protection who are burdened by the lengthy appeals process. Moreover, the
entire decision reflects what is hopefully judicial mindfulness of the
CSPA's basic goals and corresponding understanding of how its statutory
math may apply to young immigrants stuck in the judicial system.
IV. OLD SOLUTIONS VERSUS NEW: INSTITUTIONAL
"AGE OUT" UNITS VS. STATUTORY AGE-FIXING
This note now turns to comparing the long-standing institutional
methods employed by the U.S. government of dealing with the "aging out"
problem with more recent statutory methods such as the CSPA. Due to the
varying sources of authority in immigration, it is unreasonable to think that
only one method is workable.84 As illustrated below, the current state of
80. See generally Padash v. INS., 358 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2003).
81. Padash, 358 F.3d at 1170.
82. Id. at 1174.
83. Id
84. Statutes governing immigration are found at 8 U.S.C. Regulations governing the
functions of the BCIS are found at 8 C.F.R., clarified through Operations Instructions ("01")
and field memoranda. Guidelines governing the functions of the Department of State are
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the approach is a tenuous mix between the institutional and statutory
methods, although pieces of legislation such as the CSPA may represent a
shift towards the latter.
A. THE PAST AND PRESENT: INSTITUTIONAL EXPEDITING AND
"AGE OUT" UNITS
For many years now, the BCIS has had institutional means of dealing
with time sensitive issues, such as "aging out," at its four main service
centers.85 Generally, one could request that the Service Center expedite the
case for any number of compelling reasons and receive, at the very least, a
negative decision on the request to expedite within a short period of time
86(to allow for alternative planning) or, of course, an actual disposition.
While "age outs" historically merited expedited consideration, the
Service Centers specifically developed smaller "age out" units to handle
the preference petitions and adjustment of status applications of children in
danger of turning twenty-one before approval.87  The idea was
straightforward - to separate these "age out" cases from the normal load
of petitions and applications by sending them to a smaller unit, thus
avoiding the chance of an adjudicating officer misprioritizing the time-
sensitive case.88 BCIS Service Centers actively encouraged applicants to
assist in the process.89
The asylum offices took a slightly different tact to the "age out"
problem by adjudicating children's cases nunc pro tunc to avoid the
consequence of a child "aging out" before attaining permanent residence.
As recently as September 2004, they vowed to continue making such
adjudications when requested even though the CSPA might protect the
child.90
Despite the existence of the aforementioned expediting systems and
"age out" units, it would not be uncommon for applicants to have to resort
found in the Foreign Affairs Manual, clarified through periodic cables disseminated across
the consular network.
85. See Expeditious Handling Requests, supra note 26.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Texas Service Center, Age-
Outs, available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/fieldoffices/texas/aboutus.htm (last visited Oct.
1, 2004) (asking applicants to "bring age outs to our attention a minimum of six months
before the 18th or 21st birthday depending on the type of benefit sought" and to direct
reminder faxes to "AGE OUT in bold letters" to the respective product line fax numbers).
89. See, e.g., Expeditious Handling Requests, supra note 26 (instructing an applicant
that "reasons for the expedite request must be stated on the optional expedite work sheet and
should include a one page support letter," that to flag an expedite request, she should "mark
the [mailing] envelope with a red dot," and that "if your case falls within [the "age out"]
category, please indicate on your application that it is an 'Age Out' case").
90. See Mary A. Kenney, Updated Practice Advisory on the Child Status Protection
Act: Practice Advisory, AMRICAN IMMIG. L. FoUND., (March 8, 2004) at 1, n.3, available at
http://www.ailf.org/lac/lacpa_01 0504.pdf.
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to drastic measures.9' Commonly used measures include notifying a
congressman's office so that it could make a direct inquiry with the
expedited processing unit or "age out" unit or exert indirect legislative
pressure through a floor speech or private legislation.
92
In spite of its flaws, the BCIS had, at the very least, an institutional
mechanism for dealing with "aging out"; the DOS had no organization-
wide inquiry system at all, let alone one for expedited review. Inquiries to
U.S. consulates were met with notorious variability in terms of the
responsiveness of the consular staff.93 Again, what made this lack of an
institutional expediting mechanism in DOS even more problematic is the
need for extra communication between BCIS and DOS when an immigrant
petition is to be ultimately used by an alien outside the United States for
immigrant visa processing.94 This part of the process is yet another
opportunity for time to lapse while a child becomes dangerously close to
"aging out," a situation the CSPA intended to ameliorate. Worse still, since
a consular decision is not appealable, the CSPA will not protect the child
whose immigrant visa appointment was wrongly rejected and who cannot
seek the appeal that will keep the application "pending" for CSPA
purposes. 95
B. THE FUTURE: STATUTORY AGE-FIXING
Given the aforementioned shortcomings of institutional workarounds
for "age out" issues, statutory fixes, such as the CSPA, may have several
corresponding advantages. First, a statute, at least on its face, purports to
have more clarity than the personal discretion of an individual consular
officer or an "age out" unit adjudicator. It could, as the CSPA does, lay
91. See Laura A. Lichter, Nuts and Bolts of Family-Based Immigration, 79 A.L.I.-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS, IMMIGR. L. BASICS & MORE 113, 117 (2003)
(explaining that "practitioners developed creative and often effective strategies to deal with
'age outs,' however, the larger problemb - BCIS processing times - meant that many
cases were denied their rightful classification due to paperwork delays.").
92. See, e.g., Emil Guillermo, The Deportation of Yana, SF GATE, Feb. 10, 2004,
6, 54, available at http://sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2004/02/1 0
/eguillermo.DTL. While it does not involve an "age out" situation, the case described by
Guillermo highlights the frequently used practitioner tactic of lobbying members of
Congress to exert special influence on expediting and remedying "human interest"
immigration cases.
93. See, e.g., Posting of USCIT to Immigration Information, General Discussion and
Immigration Policy Issues, Agency Inquiries (Dec. 12, 2002), available at
http://www.immigrationinformation.com/showthread.php?s=09db5ea09a9fa25346c0de0275
04868d&t- 1471; cf. generally Consular Processing Tracker (various user comments noting
that interviews were smooth and officers were helpful), available at http://www.cptracker
.com (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
94. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 35. By contrast, the only administrative recourse within the DOS
is to ask the consular office to obtain an advisory opinion from DOS headquarters pursuant
to the FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, VOL. 9, app. E, "Sub-headings Used in Memoranda"
§ 202.3 (2002). As it is an advisory opinion, it is not binding on the consular officer.
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down those specific circumstances in which the "age out" phenomenon
needs to be guarded against. Second, the statute can affect all government
agencies involved in the immigration process, as opposed to BCIS
operating instructions, DOS cables, or service center public guidelines,
which may only impact one such agency, or one subdivision in such an
agency.96 Third, the statute sends an unmistakable policy message that the
U.S. government realizes the institutional problem and intends to install
some sort of broad remedy.97 Finally, practitioners continue to hang their
hats on legislative measures addressing problems such as the "age out"
phenomenon.
98
By comparison, the statute authorizing a grace period for certain
children whose petitions were delayed because of the events of September
11, 2001, was fashioned in a similar manner to the provisions of the
CSPA.99 One could argue that this choice to enact a statutory remedy as a
means of combating the "age out" issue represents a trend towards clear
legislative remedies for BCIS processing delays. That a statutory remedy
was favored over merely institutional instructions, even for the
comparatively small window of delays caused by September 11, lends
support to this argument. Incidentally, guidance about handling "age out"
matters under the CSPA matters and the relevant PATRIOT Act provisions
frequently appears together in government memoranda.' 00
V. THE CSPA AND FAMILY UNITY IN IMMIGRATION
The CSPA is the latest in a long line of recent legislation aimed at
making the immigration of families easier. However, its means of
operation - to extend the deadline for an existing process - is vastly at
odds with the approach its predecessor acts take, which is to expand a new
class of benefits to affected immigrants.
The Violence Against Woman Act ("VAWA") created a new
immigrant category for battered spouses and children.' 0' Immigrants could
essentially meet the requirement by demonstrating that in addition to
having good moral character, their U.S. citizen or permanent resident
spouse battered them or subjected them to extreme cruelty, and that
deportation would result in hardship to the individual, or, in the case of a
96. See generally sources cited supra notes 18, 23, 38, 43.
97. See sources cited supra note 76.
98. See Gordon & Niedzwiecki, supra note 5, at 20.
99. USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001 ("PATRIOT Act") § 424, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §
424, 115 Stat. 362 (2001).
100. See, e.g., INS Memorandum, supra note 23, at 1-2, n. 1; DOS Cable, supra note
38, 18.
101. Violence Against Woman Act of 1994 § 40701, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40701,
108 Stat. 1796 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1154.). VAWA also amended 8 U.S.C. § 1254 by
adding a similar provision that allowed for deportation proceedings to be suspended for
battered spouses and children.
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battered spouse, to that spouse's child.10 2 An existing form in the BCIS
structure, Form 1-360, was updated to accommodate battered spouse and
children applications.'0 3  Existing time frames were modified to
accommodate the often unpredictable nature of when aliens would become
eligible for battered individual protection due to changing family
situations. 104
Likewise, in 2001, "dual career" spouse legislation was introduced to
give the spouses of E and L nonimmigrant visa holders - the ability to
obtain work authorization. 15 By its very name, the legislation aimed to
lessen the burden on spouses of nonimmigrants who often came to the
United States in E or L status because a foreign employer assigned them
there.10 6 New categories were created in the Code of Federal Regulations
to classify such spouses, and the same form, Form 1-765, was made
available for them to apply. 10 7 The dual career legislation's grant of work
authorization was more generous than that given for other categories, since,
unlike the normal grant of one year, it could be granted for the duration of
the spouse's derivative nonimmigrant status or two years, whichever is
shorter. 108
The immigration problem that the Legal Immigration Family Equity
("LIFE") Act intended to alleviate was similar - the disruption in family
unification caused by lengthy processing times within the BCIS and DOS
system. 109 However, the LIFE Act dealt with this problem by creating
several new visa classifications.10
The K-3 and K-4 nonimmigrant visa categories allow spouses and
102. Id.
103. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(3), 204.2(c), 204.2(e) (2002).
104. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1l54(a)(1)(D) (2002), which, even before the CSPA's
enactment, already fixes the age of certain battered children applying for permanent
residence as of the date of filing; 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(e)(1)(v) (2002), which does not preclude
a battered child from applying if by the time she does so, she is no longer living with the
abusive parent. Rather, she need only to have lived with the abusive parent in the United
States sometime in the past.
105. Pub. L. No. 107-124, 115 Stat. 2402 (2002) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1184(e)); Pub
L. No. 107-125, 115 Stat. 2403 (2002) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1184(c)(2)).
106. Generally speaking, E visa holders are professionals who are trades or investors
from a country with whom the United States has established a treaty of commerce and
navigation. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(15)(E). L visa holders are professionals ("intracompany
transferees") who previous worked abroad for a company and are working for that same
company in the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (2002).
107. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 274a.12(a)(17), 274a.12(a)(18), 274a.13(a) (Supp. 2004). Note
that the first two of these sections have yet to be formally codified in 8 C.F.R., nor has
notification of an interim or final rule appeared in the Federal Register, although the
legislation enacting the work authorization was passed in January 2002.
108. See generally INS Memorandum, Guidance on Employment Authorization for
E and L Nonimmigrant Spouses, and for Determinations on the Requisite Employment
Abroad for L Blanket Petitions (Feb. 22, 2002), available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/handbook/E_LEmpAuthPub.pdf.
109. See generally LIFE Act, supra note 42.
110. Id.
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children of United States citizens who are the beneficiaries of pending
immigrant petitions filed by those citizens to come into the United States
before the approval of such petitions."' Normally, they would have to wait
for the petition's approval, then transmittal to the Department of State for
ultimate immigrant visa processing, and finally, receipt of the approved
immigrant visa after the interview to enter the United States. 2
The expansion of the V nonimmigrant visa category likewise allows
certain spouses and children of permanent residents who are the
beneficiaries of pending immigrant petitions filed by those permanent
residents to come into the United States before the approval of such
petitions." 3  While the K-3 and K-4 categories do not require the
immigrant petition to have been pending for a set period of time, the V
category requires that the immigrant petition have been pending for three
years. "14
Also of note is that both nonimmigrant visa categories allow spouses to
apply for work authorization while the immigrant petition remains
pending." 5 Again, the ability for a second parent to work is arguably a
significant tool in keeping the family unit in an immigrant family together
for several reasons: it restores the ability to work of the second parent
which she enjoyed in the foreign country, it discourages the procurement of
unlawful employment that would trigger grounds for deportation, and it
encourages integration of working families into the U.S. community in
which they reside.
By contrast, the CSPA can best be described as "tolling" a statute of
limitations. Namely, it stipulates that the filing of an immigrant petition for
a child who is a direct or derivative beneficiary will satisfy her "status" as
being that of a child, rather than the approval of such a petition."16 The
CSPA does not extend any benefits to the child or her family other than the
assurance that the child's age is "frozen" upon filing and that eligibility
will not be lost due to government processing delays."
7
In fact, the only reference in the CSPA to the alterations of benefits of
affected children is a reassurance that the CSPA will not abridge the
already existing benefits of certain battered children." 8  However, the
111. Id.
112. See generally supra notes 4, 63.
113. See LIFE Act, supra note 42.
114. Id.
115. Since K-3 and K-4 nonimmigrants have a United States citizen sponsor who has
already filed immigrant petitions on their behalf, they are allowed to file for adjustment of
status as soon as they enter and obtain employment authorization via 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(c)(9)
(2002). V nonimmigrants cannot file immediately for adjustment of status due to the family-
based second preference visa log; they therefore derive the ability to attain employment
authorization from 8 C.F.R. 274a.12(a)(15) (2002).
116. CSPA, supra note 1, §§ 2-6.
117. Seeid.
118. See CSPA, supra note 1, § 8; supra note 104.
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government's refusal to make the CSPA's principle interact with the K and
V visa categories created by the LIFE Act1 19 arguably abridges a benefit
such children should have. Specifically, while a child retains the ability to
attain permanent residence based on the immigrant petition that was filed
when she was less than twenty-one years of age, she would lose her K-4 or
V-2 status upon turning twenty-one, since the CSPA does not affect the
LIFE Act. This situation is problematic, for example, for a child who came
to the United States on a V-2 visa while the immigrant petition - timely
filed before she turned twenty-one - was pending, turned twenty-one
while that immigrant petition was pending and before she could file for
adjustment of status (due to visa backlogs), and thereby loses her V-2 status
as well as her basis for staying in the country.' 20 The complexities of such
a hypothetical aside, it is problematic to think that a nonimmigrant visa
benefit directly tied to a pending immigration petition would not be able to
protect a child's ability to stay in the country with her family despite "aging
out." On the other hand, the immigrant petition would be able to protect a
child's ability to attain permanent residence with her family despite "aging
out" via the CSPA but would not protect her right to remain with them
before she does attain permanent residence.
It is arguable that one should not have expected the CSPA to be as
generous with conferring benefits as its predecessors. After all, by its very
name, the CSPA was protecting status, as opposed to creating "equity" for
families, expanding "careers" for families used to having two working
parents, or offering an alternative route to immigration for aliens who
would have reached permanent residence in traditional fashion but for the
presence of an abusive parent and spouse.'
21
But its characterization as a "specific" remedy for only a handful of
situations seems to suggest that the CSPA adds little, even conceptually, to
the theme of family unity in immigration. 122 A few practitioners have
rolled out the notable argument that acts such as the CSPA merely treat
symptoms of a flawed immigration system - the delays of the system -
rather than the cause, and that the system is practically incapable of, if not
sometimes incompetent in, the handling and adjudication of immigrant
benefits. 123 Taking the theme of such arguments further, one could say that
119. See supra text accompanying note 40.
120. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2002), which requires an alien's eligibility for an
immigrant visa at the time of filing to adjust. In this situation, the alien child may face a
second-preference visa backlog preventing him from having eligibility, turn twenty-one,
lose the V-2 status upon turning twenty-one, and therefore have no "status" to adjust.
121. See generally CSPA, supra note 1; LIFE Act, supra note 42; Pub. L. No. 107-
124, supra note 99; Pub L. No. 107-125, supra note 105; VAWA, supra note 101.
122. See Fragomen & Gordon, supra note 54, at 190 (describing the CSPA as
providing "specific remedies for several situations where aging out becomes a problem").
123. See Spanier, supra note 74, at 373 (lamenting that although "there are consistent
calls to reform the INS .... [njo previous proposal, and no current proposal fundamentally
address the problem of back logged visa processing... [a]nother current fix-the-symptom is
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the CSPA represents a desire to fix shortcomings in a currently flawed
system rather than a broader attempt to reform a system inflexible to the
unification needs of immigrant families. Indeed, many other pieces of
legislation, though unlikely to succeed, take exactly this tact - suggesting
everything from zeroing out employment-based immigration, to allowing
family-based applicants a shorter wait, to treating relatives of permanent
residents on equal footing as those of U.S. citizens.
124
Worse yet, the confusion noted above in the interpretive government
memoranda and the practitioner commentary on the CSPA paint the picture
of a piece of legislation that at its best was well meaning but may cause
more headaches in discerning how the goal it purports to accomplish can be
achieved in practice. 125  That the energy of immigrant enforcement
agencies in the government and scholars in the immigration law
practitioner community might be wasted on the intricacies of "CSPA math"
as opposed to broader yet thoughtful ways of promoting family unity that
expand benefits, rather than codifying a "grace period" meant to
compensate for bureaucratic delays.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CSPA was a promising piece of legislation swiftly passed by
Congress and greatly anticipated by the immigration law community. Yet,
after nearly two years of guidance, clarification, commentary, and
criticism, practical confusion as to its usage still remains. Indeed, the
dearth of practitioner literature after 2003 - the CSPA's own "one-year
anniversary" might suggest the community's resignation to the idea that the
CSPA was not a broad, meaningful fix to the "age out" problem, and that
very little is left for meaningful interpretation given its narrow
applicability.
The CSPA suffers from being thematically inconsistent with other
recent legislation aimed at family unity. Admittedly, the CSPA is simi!ar
to such pieces of legislation by aiming to ameliorate the detrimental effects
on family unity caused by processing delays. Yet rather than expanding a
new class of benefits to immigrant children stuck in the middle of
unforgiving delays in the permanent residence process, the CSPA merely
buys the government time to sort out its legendary backlogs. Almost
rightfully so, practitioners have turned their collective noses up at yet
being proposed by Senator Dianne Feinstein in the Child Status Protection Act.").
124. See, e.g., Mass Immigration Reduction Act of 2001, H.R. 2712, 107th Cong.
(2001) (essentially allowing only immediate relatives of United States citizens and first
preference employment-based aliens to receive permanent residence during a proposed
moratorium); H.R. 814, 107th Cong. (2001) (providing for the admission of spouses of
permanent resident aliens without the current numerical limitations that exist at 8 U.S.C. §
1153(a)(2) (2002), although it is worth noting that Representative Andrews did not include
children of permanent resident aliens in his bill).
125. See Fox-lsicoff& Klasko, supra note 56.
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another gesture meant to treat the effects of a slow, obsolete system instead
of reforming that system itself. Much ink has been spilled trying to make
the CSPA's "math" add up to an equation that makes sense and ultimately
protects the ability of immigrant children to stay with their immediate
families. In the end, practitioners might need to line up behind more
sweeping legislation that overhauls the immigration processing system,
bombard congressional offices with requests for private bills for each
immigrant child who becomes a "human interest" case, or attack the lack of
the CSPA's breadth through judicial challenges.
Courts seem to understand their role in interpreting how the CSPA
ameliorates the effects of the court system's lengthy appeals process just as
it intends to remedy BCIS administrative delays. Ultimately, legislators,
practitioners, and government adjudicators of immigrant petitions will need
to work more closely in concert to develop meaningful immigration reform
that does more than apply damage control to processing delays. Rather
than just increasing funding or stipulating the creation of additional
adjudication units, perhaps they should consider more long-term revisions
to the immigration laws that finally lighten the burdens and decrease the
wait times of the family-based immigrant preference system and its visa
backlogs. Furthermore, they should take the lessons of previous pieces of
less controversial, more benevolent pieces of legislation to heart and
explore ways to expand benefits for immigrant children in danger of "aging
out," and not just stop the clock when processing has gone on too long.
Ultimately, the solution to the family unity question should not be
about complicated math protecting a child's status. Rather, it should be
about a better legal system providing tangible benefits to ensure a child's
lasting connections to her family throughout the difficulties of the
immigration process.
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